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Abstract
Interpersonal relations are fickle, with
close friendships often dissolving into en-
mity. In this work, we explore linguis-
tic cues that presage such transitions by
studying dyadic interactions in an on-
line strategy game where players form al-
liances and break those alliances through
betrayal. We characterize friendships that
are unlikely to last and examine temporal
patterns that foretell betrayal.
We reveal that subtle signs of imminent
betrayal are encoded in the conversational
patterns of the dyad, even if the victim
is not aware of the relationship’s fate.
In particular, we find that lasting friend-
ships exhibit a form of balance that man-
ifests itself through language. In contrast,
sudden changes in the balance of certain
conversational attributes—such as positive
sentiment, politeness, or focus on future
planning—signal impending betrayal.
1 Introduction
A major focus in computational social science has
been the study of interpersonal relations through
data. However, social interactions are compli-
cated, and we rarely have access all of the data that
define the relationship between friends or enemies.
As an alternative, thought experiments like the
prisoner’s dilemma (Axelrod and Dion, 1988) are
used to explain behavior. Two prisoners—denied
communication—must decide whether to cooper-
ate with each other or defect. Such simple and
elegant tools initially helped understand many real
world scenarios from pricing products (Rosenthal,
1981) to athletes doping (Buechel et al., 2013).
Despite its power, the prisoner’s dilemma remains
woefully unrealistic. Cooperation and betrayal do
not happen in a cell cut off from the rest of the
world. Instead, real interactions are mediated by
communication: promises are made, then broken,
and met with recriminations.
To study the complex social phenomenon of be-
trayal, we turn to data and observe the players of
Diplomacy (Sharp, 1978), a war-themed strategy
game where friendships and betrayals are orches-
trated primarily through language. Diplomacy,
like the prisoner’s dilemma, is a repeated game
where players choose to either cooperate or betray
other players. Diplomacy is so engaging that it
is played around the world, not only casually as a
board game but also over the Internet and in formal
settings such as world championships.1 Players
converse throughout the game and victory hinges
on enlisting others’ support through persuasive-
ness and cunning duplicity. To illustrate the social
relations that carry out throughout the game, con-
sider the following exchange between two Diplo-
macy allies:
Germany: Can I suggest you move your armies
east and then I will support you? Then next year
you move [there] and dismantle Turkey. I will
deal with England and France, you take out Italy.
Austria: Sounds like a perfect plan! Happy to
follow through. And—thank you Bruder!
Austria is very polite and positive in its reply,
and appreciates Germany’s support and generos-
ity. They have been good allies for the better part
of the game. However, immediately after this ex-
change, Austria suddenly invades German terri-
tory. The intention to do so was so well concealed
that Germany did not see the betrayal coming; oth-
erwise it would have taken advantage first. Indeed,
if we follow their conversation after the attack, we
find Germany surprised:
Germany: Not really sure what to say, except that
I regret you did what you did.
1A recent episode of This American Life describes the
Diplomacy game in a competitive offline setting: http://
www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/
episode/531/got-your-back?act=1
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Such scenarios suggest an important research
challenge: is the forthcoming betrayal signaled
by linguistic cues appearing in the (ostensibly
friendly) conversation between the betrayer and
the eventual victim? A positive answer would sug-
gest not only that the betrayer unknowingly re-
veals their future treachery, but also that the even-
tual victim fails to notice these signals. Captur-
ing these signals computationally would therefore
mean outperforming the human players.
In this work, we provide a framework for ana-
lyzing a dyad’s evolving communication patterns
and provide evidence of subtle but consistent con-
versational patterns that foretell the unilateral dis-
solution of a friendship. In particular, imminent
betrayal is signaled by sudden changes in the bal-
ance of conversational attributes such as positive
sentiment, politeness, and structured discourse.
Furthermore, we show that by exploiting these
cues in a prediction setting we can anticipate im-
minent betrayal better than the human players.
After briefly describing the game (Section 2),
we focus on how the structure of the game pro-
vides convenient, reliable indicators of whether
pairs of participants are friends or foes (Section 3).
Given these labels, we explore linguistic features
that are predictive of whether friendships will end
in betrayal (Section 4) and, if so, when the betrayal
will happen (Section 5).
While our focus is on a single popular game,
we choose methods that generalize to other do-
mains, revealing dynamics present in other social
interactions (Section 6). We discuss how automat-
ically predicting stable relationships and betrayal
can more broadly help advance the study of trust
and relationships using computational linguistics.
2 Communication and Conflict in
Diplomacy
A game of Diplomacy begins in 1901 with play-
ers casting themselves as the European powers at
the eve of the first world war: England, Germany,
France, Russia, Austria, Italy, and the Ottoman
Empire. The goal of the game (like other war
games such as Risk or Axis & Allies) is to cap-
ture all of the territories on the game board (Fig-
ure 1). The games are divided into years start-
ing from 1901 and each year is divided into two
seasons—Spring and Fall. Each season consists
of two alternating phases: diplomacy—the players
communicate to form strategies—and orders—the
Figure 1: The full Diplomacy board representing Europe
circa 1914. The seven nations struggle to control the map.
players submit their moves for the season. Seasons
are therefore the main unit of game time.
2.1 Movement, Orders, and Battles
On the board, each player can operate a unit for
each city they control. During each turn, these
pieces have the option of moving to an adjacent
territory. What makes Diplomacy unique is that
all players submit their written (or electronic) or-
ders; these orders are executed simultaneously;
and there is no randomness (e.g., dice). Thus, the
outcome of the game depends only on the commu-
nication, cooperation, and movements of players.
When two units end their turn in the same terri-
tory, it implies a battle. Who wins the battle is de-
cided purely based on numerical superiority (ties
go to defenders). Instead of moving, a unit can
support another unit; large armies can be created
through intricate networks of support. The side
with the largest army wins the battle.
The process of supporting a unit is thus critical
for both a successful offensive move and a suc-
cessful defense. Often, a lone player lacks the
units to provide enough support to his attacks and
thus needs the help of others.2 Because these or-
ders (both movement and support) are machine
readable, we have a clear indication of when play-
ers are working together (supporting each other) or
working against each other (attacking each other);
we will use this to define relationships between
2 While support can come from a player’s own units, allies
often combine resources. For example, if an English army
in Belgium is attacking a Germany Army in Ruhr, a French
army in Burgundy could strengthen that attack. This is ac-
complished by the French player submitting a move explicitly
stating “I support England’s attack from Belgium to Ruhr”.
players (Section 3). However, coordinating these
actions between players requires cooperation and
diplomacy.
2.2 Communication
In the diplomacy phase of the game, players talk to
each other. These conversations are either public
or—more typically—one-on-one. Conversations
include greetings, extra-game discussions (e.g.,
“did you see Game of Thrones?”), low-level tac-
tics (“if you attack Armenia, I’ll support you”),
and high-level strategy (“we need to control Cen-
tral Europe”). The content of these messages
forms the object of our study.
Because of the centrality of language to Diplo-
macy, we can learn the rhetorical and social de-
vices players use to build and break trust. Because
this language is embedded in every game, it has
convenient properties: similar situations are re-
peated, the goals are clear, and machine-readable
orders confirm which players are enemies and
which are friends. In the next section, we explore
the Diplomacy data.
2.3 Preprocessing
We use games from two popular online platforms
for playing Diplomacy.3 The average season of an
online Diplomacy game lasts nine days. We re-
move non-standard games caused by differences
between the two platforms, as well as games that
are still in progress. Moreover, in each game, we
filter out setup messages, regulatory messages to
and from the administrator of the game and mes-
sages declaring the state of the game, keeping only
messages between the players. This leaves 249
games with 145.000 total messages.
The dataset confirms that communication is an
essential part of Diplomacy: half of the games
have over 515 messages exchanged between the
players, while the top quartile has over 750 mes-
sages per game. Also, non-trivial messages (with
at least one sentence) tend to be complex: over
half of them have at least five sentences, and the
top quartile consists of messages with eight or
more sentences.
3 Relationships and Their Stability
In this section, we explore how interactions within
the game of Diplomacy define the relationships
3Anonymized transcripts and more information available
at http://vene.ro/betrayal/
Event Time What happened
F1 4 B supports V’s army in Vienna
F2 3 V supports B’s attack from Warsaw to Silesia
F3 3 B again supports V in Vienna
F4 1 V supports B’s move from Venice to Tyrolia
H5 0 B attacks V in Vienna
H6 -1 V retaliates, attacking B in Warsaw
4 3 2 1                  0 (betrayal)
Game season
Betrayer
Victim
F1 F3
F2 F4
H5
H6
Figure 2: A friendship between Player B (eventual betrayer)
and Player V (eventual victim) unravels. For the first four
events, the players exchange Friendly acts (in green). Even-
tually B’s unilateral hostile act betrays V’s trust, leading to
hostility (in red). The dissolution takes place at the time of
the first hostile act (t = 0) and we index game seasons going
back from the betrayal, such that lower indices mean betrayal
is nearer.
between players. While such dyadic relationships
can be undefined (e.g., England and Turkey are in
opposite corners of the map), specific interactions
between players indicate whether they are friendly
or hostile to each other.
Friendships and hostilities. Alliances are a natu-
ral part of the game of Diplomacy. While the best
outcome for a player is a solo victory against all
other players, this is rare and difficult to achieve
without any cooperation and assistance. Instead,
the game’s structure encourages players to form
long-term alliances. Allies often settle for (less
prestigious) team victories, but these coalitions
can also crumble as players seek a (more presti-
gious) solo victory for themselves. This game dy-
namic naturally leads to the formation of friendly
and hostile dyads, which are relatively easy to
identify through post-hoc analysis of the game, as
explained next.
Acts of friendship. Diplomacy provides a support
option for players to help each other: this game
mechanism (discussed in Section 2) provides un-
equivocal evidence of friendship. When two play-
ers engage in a series of such friendly acts, we will
say that the two are in a relation of friendship.
Acts of hostility. Unlike support, hostile actions
are not explicitly marked in Diplomacy. We con-
sider two players to be hostile if they get involved
in any unambiguous belligerent action, such as in-
vading one another’s territory, or if one supports
an enemy of the other.4
4 In Diplomacy all game actions are simultaneous, and
this can lead to ambiguous interpretation of the nature of a
Betrayal. As in real life, friendships can be
broken unilaterally: an individual can betray his
friend by engaging in a hostile act towards her.
Figure 2 shows two players who started out as
friends (green) but became hostile (red) after a be-
trayal. Importantly, until the last act of friendship
(game season t = 1), the victim is unaware that she
will be betrayed (otherwise she would not have en-
gaged in an act of friendship) and the betrayer has
no interest in signaling his planned duplicity to his
partner.
This setting poses the following research chal-
lenge: are there linguistic cues that appear during
the friendly conversations and portend the upcom-
ing betrayal? A positive answer would have two
implications: the betrayer unknowingly hints at
his future treachery, and the victim could have no-
ticed it, but did not. We will explore this question
in the following sections.
Relationship stability. Before venturing into the
linguistic analysis of betrayals, we briefly ex-
plore the dynamics underlying these state transi-
tions. We find that, as in real life, friendships
are much more likely to collapse into hostilities
than the reverse: in Diplomacy, the probability
of a friendship to dissolve into enmity is about
five times greater than that of hostile players be-
coming friends. The history of the relationship
also matters. A friendship built on the founda-
tion of many cooperative acts is more likely to en-
dure than friendship with a short history, and long-
lasting conflict is less likely to become a friend-
ship. In numbers, the probability that a two season
long friendship ends is 35%, while for pairs who
have helped each other for ten or more seasons, the
probability of betrayal is only 23%. Similarly, the
probability that a two season long conflict resolves
is 7%, while players at war for over ten seasons
have only a 5% chance to make up. These num-
bers aren’t particularly shocking—the idea that the
passage of time has an effect on the strength of a
relationship is intuitive. For the purposes of this
study, we control for such effects in order to cap-
ture purely linguistic hints of betrayal.
Starting from the relationship definitions dis-
cussed in this section, in what follows we show
how subtle linguistic patterns of in-game player
pair’s interactions. Our definition of hostility intentionally
discards such ambiguous evidence. For instance, if two play-
ers attempt to move into the same unoccupied territory, this
is not necessarily aggressive: allies sometimes use this tactic
(“bouncing”) to ensure that a territory remains unoccupied.
conversations can reveal whether or not a friend-
ship will turn hostile or not.
4 Language Foretelling Betrayal
In this section, we examine whether the conver-
sations between two Diplomacy allies contain lin-
guistic cues foretelling if their friendship will last
or end in betrayal. We expect these cues to be sub-
tle, since we only consider messages exchanged
when the two individuals are being ostensibly
friendly; when at least one of them—the eventual
victim—is unaware of the relationship’s fate.
4.1 What Constitutes a Betrayal
To find betrayals, we must first find friendships.
Building on the discussion from Section 3, we
consider a friendship to be stable if it is ongo-
ing, established, and reciprocal. Thus, we focus
on relationships that contain at least two consecu-
tive and reciprocated acts of friendships that span
at last at least three seasons in game time. We also
check that no more than five seasons pass between
two acts of friendships, as friendships can fade.
Betrayals are established and reciprocal friend-
ships that end with at least two hostile acts. The
person initiating the first of these hostile acts is
the betrayer, while the other person is the victim.5
For each betrayal instance, we find the most
similar stable friendship that was never dissolved
by betrayal. Using a greedy heuristic, we se-
lect friendships that match the betrayals on two
statistics: the length of the friendship and num-
ber of seasons since the start of the game. Af-
ter this matching process, we find no significant
difference in either of the two variables (Mann-
Whitney p > 0.3). Matching betrayals with last-
ing friendships in this fashion removes historical
and relationship-type effects such as those dis-
cussed in Section 3, and focuses the comparison
on the variable of interest: whether a given stable
friendship will end in a betrayal or not.
4.2 Linguistic Harbingers of Betrayal
Now we switch to exploring linguistic features
that correlate with future betrayal in the controlled
setting described above. We start from the intu-
ition that a stable relationship should be balanced
(Jung et al., 2012): friends will help each other
5 In rare cases, the betrayal can be mutual (i.e., both play-
ers start attacking each other in the same season). In such
cases, we consider both betrayals.
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Figure 3: Friendships that will end in betrayal are imbalanced. The eventual betrayer is more positive, more polite, but plans
less than the victim. The white bars correspond to matched lasting friendships, where the roles of potential betrayer and victim
are arbitrarily assigned; in these cases, the imbalances disappear. Error bars mark bootstrapped standard errors (Efron, 1979).
while enemies will fight each other. A precarious
friendship might feel one-sided, while a conflict
may turn to friendship through a magnanimous
olive branch. Therefore, we focus our attention on
linguistic features that have the potential to signal
an imbalance in the communication patterns of the
dyad.
To ensure that we are studying conversational
patterns that occur only when the two individuals
in the dyad are ostensibly being friends, we only
extract features from the messages exchanged be-
fore the last act of friendship, that is, before the
season labeled 1 in Figure 2. Considering the na-
ture of this setting, we can only hope for subtle
linguistic cues: if there were salient linguistic sig-
nals, then the victim would notice and preempt the
betrayal. Instead, they are taken by surprise; the
following is a typical reaction of a player after hav-
ing been betrayed by a friend:
Well that move was sour. I’m guessing France
put you up to it, citing my large growth. This was
a pity, as I was willing to give you the lion’s share
of centers in the west. [...] If you voiced your
concerns I would have supported you in most of
the western centers. Unfortunately now you have
jumped out of the pan into the fire.
Sentiment. Changes in the sentiment expressed in
conversation can reflect emotional responses, so-
cial affect, as well as the status of the relationship
as a whole (Gottman and Levenson, 2000; Wang
and Cardie, 2014). We quantify the proportion of
exchanged sentences that transmit positive, neutral
and negative sentiment using the Stanford Senti-
ment Analyzer (Socher et al., 2013).6 Example
sentences with these features, as well as all other
features we consider, can be found in Table 1.
6We collapse the few examples classified as extreme posi-
tive and extreme negative examples into positive and negative,
respectively.
We find that an imbalance in the amount of pos-
itive sentiment expressed by the two individuals is
a subtle sign that the relation will end in betrayal
(Figure 3a, left; one-sample t-test on the imbal-
ance, p = 0.008). When looking closer at who is
the source of this imbalance (Figure 3a, right), we
find that that it is the eventual betrayer that uses
significantly more positive sentiment than the con-
trol counterpart in the matched friendship (two-
sample t-test, p = 0.001). This is somewhat sur-
prising, and we speculate that this is the betrayer
overcompensating for his forthcoming actions.
Argumentation and Discourse. Structured dis-
course and well-made arguments are essential in
persuasion (Cialdini, 2000; Anand et al., 2011).
To capture discourse complexity, we measure the
average number of explicit discourse connectors
per sentence (Prasad et al., 2008).7 These markers
belong to four coarse classes: comparison, contin-
gency, expansive, and temporal. To capture plan-
ning, we group temporal markers that refer to the
future (e.g.,“next”, “thereafter”) in a separate cat-
egory. To quantify the level of argumentation, we
calculate average number of claim and premise
markers per sentence, as identified by Stab and
Gurevych (2014). We also measure the number of
request sentences in each message, as identified by
the heuristics in the Stanford Politeness classifier
(Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al., 2013).
The structure of the discourse offers clues to
whether the friendship will last. For example, Fig-
ure 3b shows that in friendships doomed to end in
betrayal, the victim uses planning discourse mark-
ers significantly more often than the betrayer (one-
sample t-test on the imbalance, p = 0.03), who is
7We remove the connectors that appear in over 20% of the
messages (and, for, but, if, as, or, and so).
Feature Example sentence from the data
Positive sentiment I will still be thrilled if it turns out you win this war.
Negative sentiment It’s not a great outcome, but still an OK one.
Neutral sentiment Do you concur with my assumption?
Claim But I believe that E/F have discarded him and so I think he might bite.
Premise I put Italy out because I wanted to work with you.
Comparison We can trade centers as much as we like after that.
Contingency He did not, thus we are indeed in fine shape to continue as planned.
Expansion Would you rather see WAR-UKR, or GAL-UKR?
Temporal I think he can still be effective to help me take TUN while you take ROM.
Planning HOL should fall next year, and then MUN and KIE shortly thereafter.
Number of requests
Politeness I wonder if you shouldn’t try to support Italy into MAR ... What do you think?
Subjectivity I’m just curious what you think.
Talkativeness
Table 1: Summary of the linguistic cues we consider.
likely to be aware that the cooperation has no fu-
ture. (More argumentation and discourse features
will be discussed in the following sections.)
Politeness. Pragmatic information can also be in-
formative of the relation between two individu-
als; for example Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al.
(2013) show that differences in levels of polite-
ness can echo differences in status and power. We
measure the politeness of each message using the
Stanford Politeness classifier and find that friend-
ships that end in betrayal show a slight imbalance
between the level of politeness used by the two
individuals (one-sample t-test on the imbalance,
p = 0.09) and that in those cases the future vic-
tim is the one that is less polite.
Subjectivity. We explored phrases expressing
opinion, accusation, suspicion, and speculation
taken from an automatically collected lexicon
(Riloff and Wiebe, 2003), but did not find sig-
nificant differences between betrayals and control
friendships.
Talkativeness. Another conversational aspect is
the amount of communication flowing between the
players, in each direction. To quantify this, we
simply use the number of messages sent, the av-
erage number of sentences per message, and the
average number of words per sentence. Abnor-
mal communication patterns can indicate a rela-
tionship breakdown. For example, friendships that
dissolve are characterized by an imbalance in the
number of messages exchanged between the two
players (one-sample t-test, p < 0.001).
These results show that there are indeed subtle
linguistic imbalance signals that are indicative of
an forthcoming betrayal, even in a setting in which
the victim is not aware of the impending betrayal.
4.3 Predictive Power
To test whether these linguistic cues have any pre-
dictive power and to explore how they interact, we
turn to a binary classification setting in which we
try to detect whether a player V will be betrayed
by a player B. (We will call player V the poten-
tial victim and player B the potential betrayer.)
Expert humans—the actual victims—performed
poorly on this task and were not able to tell that
they will be betrayed: by virtue of how the dataset
is constructed, the performance of the human play-
ers is at chance level.
We use the same balanced dataset of matched
betrayals and lasting friendships as before and
consider as classification instances all the seasons
coming from each of the two classes (663 betrayal
seasons and 712 from lasting friendships). As fea-
tures, we use the cues described above and sum-
marized in Table 1, differentiated by source: V
or B. We use logistic regression after univariate
feature selection. The best setting for the model
parameters8 is selected via 5-fold cross valida-
tion, ensuring that instances from the same game
are never found in both train and validation folds.
The resulting model achieves a cross-validation
accuracy of 57% and a Matthews correlation co-
efficient of 0.14, significantly above chance (52%
accuracy and 0 Matthews correlation coefficient),
with 95% bootstrapped confidence. This indicates
8 We optimize the number of features selected, the scor-
ing function used (ANOVA or χ2), whether to automatically
reweigh the classes, the regularizer (`1 or `2), and the value
of the regularization parameter C between 10−12 and 1012.
From Positive feature From Negative feature
B Positive sentiment B Expansion
B Sentences B Comparison
B Contingency
B No. Words
B Planning
B Negative sentiment
Table 2: Selected features for recognizing upcoming be-
trayal, in decreasing order of the absolute value of their co-
efficients. The From column indicates whether the message
containing the feature was sent by the potential Betrayer or
the potential Victim. (In this case, only betrayer features were
selected.) Positive features indicate that a friendship is more
likely to end in betrayal.
that, unlike the actual players, the classifier is able
to exploit subtle linguistic signals that surface in
the conversation.9
The selected features and their coefficients are
reported in Table 2. On top of the observations
we previously made, the feature ranking reveals
that writing more sentences per message is more
common when one will betray. Discourse features
also prove relevant: more complex discourse in-
dicates a lower likelihood of the player betraying
(e.g., Figure 3b).
Overall, the selected linguistic features capture
a consistent signal that characterizes people’s lan-
guage when they are about to betray: they tend to
plan less than their victims, use less structure in
their communication, and are overly positive.
5 Sudden yet Inevitable Betrayal
The results from Section 4 suggest that language
cues can be subtle signs of future relationship dis-
ruption. Even though people are aware that most
relationships eventually end, one would still prefer
to reap their benefits as long as possible. In Diplo-
macy, despite the common knowledge that every-
one prefers to win alone, players still take chances
on long-lasting alliances. This leads to an alter-
nate research question: assuming that a relation-
ship will be disrupted, how soon can one expect
to be betrayed? This is still just as challenging for
the expert human players, as they were not able to
anticipate and thereby avoid betrayal.
Next we investigate if the variation of the
linguistic cues over time can predict imminent
change in the relationship. We consider only the
9Since our focus is on understanding linguistic aspects
of betrayal, rather than on achieving the best possible per-
formance on this particular Diplomacy task, we do not use
game-specific information, such as the players’ position on
the map, or any information not accessible to both players.
subset of betrayals used in Section 4, and label
each individual game season with its distance from
the end of the friendship (as in Figure 2). We pre-
vent short alliances of circumstance from distort-
ing the features close to betrayal by keeping only
friendships lasting at least four seasons.
We consider the same cues described in Ta-
ble 1, and train a classifier to discriminate between
the season preceding the last friendly interaction
and all the older seasons. This learning task is
imbalanced, with only 14% of the seasons being
immediately before the betrayal. Thus, we op-
timize F1 score and also measure the Matthews
correlation coefficient, which takes a value of 0
for uninformative predictions (random or major-
ity). The best model achieves an F1 score of 0.31
and a Matthews correlation coefficient of 0.17,
significantly better than chance with 95% boot-
strapped confidence. This shows that we can cap-
ture signs of imminent betrayal, something that
even the skilled human players have failed to do.
Furthermore, 39% of the predicted false positives
are within two seasons of the last friendly act. This
suggests that sometimes the warning signs can ap-
pear slightly earlier.
The selected features, displayed in Table 3, re-
flect some of the effects identified in Section 4,
such as the importance of positive sentiment and
planning discourse markers. Betrayers have a ten-
dency to use more positive sentiment during the
last moment of purported friendliness (Figure 4a).
Also, expressing more opinions through claims is
a sign that one will not betray right away. Three of
the discourse features (comparison, contingency
and expansion) are selected as imbalance features
(they have near-opposite coefficients for the be-
trayer and for the victim), indicating that as be-
trayal approaches, victims are less eloquent than
betrayers. Interestingly, some predictive signals
come only from the victim: a partner using in-
creasingly more planning words is at higher risk
of being betrayed (Figure 4b). This could be ex-
plained by the pressure that making plans for the
future can put on a relationship. A similar reason-
ing applies for making many requests.
We also find that a decrease in a partner’s polite-
ness presages their imminent betrayal. The change
in politeness over time (Figure 4c) reveals a rever-
sal in the politeness imbalance of the pair. This
explains why politeness is not a good enough fea-
ture in detecting long-term betrayal. The behav-
4 and up 3 2 1 betrayal
Seasons leading up to betrayal
-10%
-5%
0%
+5%
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5%
15%
25%
betrayer
victim
(a) Positive sentiment
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Figure 4: Changes in balance can mark imminent betrayal. As the breakdown approaches, the betrayer becomes more positive
but less polite, and the victim tends to make more requests and become more polite. Error bars mark bootstrapped standard
errors (Efron, 1979).
From Positive feature From Negative feature
V Comparison B Claims
V Positive sentiment B Politeness
V Contingency B Contingency
V Planning B Subjectivity
V Requests B Expansion
V Expansion B No. Sentences
B Comparison
Table 3: Selected features for recognizing imminent be-
trayal, in decreasing order of the absolute value of their co-
efficients. The From column indicates whether the message
containing the feature comes from the potential Betrayer or
the potential Victim. Positive features indicate that an ex-
change is more likely to be followed by immediate betrayal.
ior could have two intuitive explanations. On one
hand, if the betrayer has planned the act in ad-
vance, politeness can be a strategy for deception.
On the other hand, if the betrayer receives impo-
lite requests, the value of the relationship can de-
crease, hastening a betrayal. We observe a simi-
lar dynamic for the average number of sentences
per message sent by the betrayer; the feature is
selected in both prediction tasks, but with oppo-
site signs: more complex messages suggest that
betrayal will happen, but not right away.
Studying language change as betrayal draws
nearer uncovers effects that cannot be seen when
looking at an entire friendship on average. For
example, while excessively positive and polite
partners are potential betrayers, people who have
themselves suddenly become more polite are
likely to become victims soon.
6 Relevance Beyond the Game
While discovering betrayal in one online game
is a fun and novel task, our work connects with
broader research in computational social science.
In this section we describe how our work tackles
issues that previous research on alliances, negoti-
ation, and relationships have faced.
Cooperation and relationship building are an es-
sential part of many activities: completing a group
project, opening a business, or forging a new rela-
tionship. Each of these has been the subject of ex-
tensive research to understand what makes for ef-
fective relationships. Jung et al. (2012) show that
a balanced working relationship is more likely to
lead to better performance on tasks like pair pro-
gramming. Imai and Gelfand (2010) show that
understanding cultural norms improves negotia-
tions. While these data are elicited in the lab, our
“found” data are inexpensive because Diplomacy
games are fun and inherently anonymized.
Romance is a popular and more real-world phe-
nomenon that helps us understand how relation-
ships form and dissolve. The research that tells
us how language shapes early dating (Ranganath
et al., 2009) and whether an existing relationship
will continue (Slatcher and Pennebaker, 2006;
Gottman and Levenson, 2000; Ireland et al., 2011)
is formed from an incomplete sample of a course
of a relationship. In contrast, a game of Diplomacy
is shorter than almost any marriage and we have
a complete account of all interactions throughout
the entire relationship. Furthermore, this work fo-
cuses on the unilateral and asymmetric act of be-
trayal, rather than on the question of whether a re-
lation will last.
Playing Diplomacy online is less tangible than a
romantic relationship, but understanding trust and
deception in online interactions (Riegelsberger et
al., 2003; Newman et al., 2003; Hancock et al.,
2007; Ott et al., 2011; Feng et al., 2012) is partic-
ularly important because the Internet marketplace
is a growing driver of economic growth (Boyd,
2003). Diplomacy offers a setting in which decep-
tion occurs spontaneously in the context of com-
plex relationships.
7 Conclusions
Despite people’s best effort to hide it, the inten-
tion to betray can leak through the language one
uses. Detecting it is not a task that we expect to
be solvable with high accuracy, as that would en-
tail a reliable “recipe” for avoiding betrayal in re-
lationships; in this unrealistic scenario, betrayals
would be unlikely to exist. While the effects we
find are subtle, they bring new insights into the re-
lation between linguistic balance and stability in
relationships.
Although we use one game to develop our
methodology, the framework developed here can
be extended to be applied to a wide range of social
interaction. Social dynamics in collaborative set-
tings can bear striking similarities to those present
in war games. For example, in Wikipedia “edit
wars”—where attacks correspond to edit reverts—
are common on issues relating to politics, religion,
history and nationality, among others (Kittur et al.,
2007). As in Diplomacy, Wikipedia editors form
alliances, argue and negotiate about possible com-
promises. A challenge for future work is to find re-
liable linguistic cues that generalize well between
such settings.
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